K/75 RGR & E/58 LRP & 4th ID LRRP & 4th ID LRS HISTORY

THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND ACTIVITIES OF K COMPANY(RANGER), 75TH INFANTRY (AIRBORNE), 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION, REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

During the Vietnam War K Company (RANGER), 75TH Infantry (Airborne) was on the active roles of the United States Army from 1 February 1969 to 10 December1970. The Ranger Companies of the Viet Nam War were in continuous combat longer than organized companies of Rangers in any other war, then or since.

With them, a proud and unique military heritage was resurrected from the pages of American history and a new chapter was added. Ranger units had been raised and deployed in an ad hoc fashion in every one of our nation's wars, but they were quickly disbanded after each war. Not so after Vietnam, where they proved themselves henceforth indispensable. The nature of warfare had changed. These Rangers helped write the new rules.

The guns, the uniform, and the method of travel had evolved, but the Ranger mission in Viet Nam was essentially the same as it had been since the 1600's, when American colonists "ranged" far and wide to defend the frontiers:

Small groups of highly skilled and courageous men armed and equipped with the latest weapons and technology, went out to confront an enemy and defeat him against all odds.

The units of the 75th Infantry (Airborne) Regiment of Rangers were so successful in their operations that they were singled out for special recognition by the Secretary of the Army. They were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation, the Valorous Unit Award, the Vietnam Cross of Gallantry with Palm, and the Vietnam Civil Action Honor Medal.

After the Vietnam War, remnants of the 13 companies of the 75th Ranger Infantry Regiment formed the nucleus of the first permanent Ranger unit in American History:
1st Battalion (RANGER), 75th Infantry (Airborne); Colors pass in review at activation ceremony and parade, 1 July 1974, at Fort Stewart, Georgia.

There are now three Airborne Ranger Battalions.
Today, in the first decade of the 21st Century, US Army Rangers are a force that can be anywhere in the world in 18 hours. Rangers can reconnoiter and assault any target, on any terrain, in any climate, at any time, day or night. Their training is arduous and specialized. Ranger Officers train and fight alongside the men.

Rangers differ from Special Forces. The Green Berets were created for - but not limited to - counterinsurgency warfare. They are trained to work with the indigenous populations where they are deployed. Most Green Berets are Ranger qualified.

VIETNAM: WAR AGAINST COMMUNISM

Like the Korean War which preceded it by about a decade, Vietnam was a shooting war against communist aggression. "Hot" wars in the midst of the longest of the three world wars of the 20th Century, Korea and Vietnam were the unfinished business of WW II and remain the legacy of America's "Greatest Generation."

Communism is the most deadly force the world has ever known. It is a conspiracy to rule the world by a so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat" which is really nothing more than abject tyranny over a fearful populace. It is estimated that between 180 million and 200 million lives have been taken by that conspiracy. By contrast, the other "ism,"- Nazism - took 20 million lives during WW II.

According to the US Congress, the "Cold War," officially lasted between September 2, 1945 and December 26, 1991. Historians in future generations may argue who actually won the "Cold War…"

Cold War Medal*

*Approved, Section 1084 of Public Law 105-85, November 18, 198, for any member of the US Armed Forces who served on active duty during this period.

By terror, war, or subversion - whichever worked for them at any given moment to complete their world revolution, communist forces sought to impose total dominion over the world, one nation at a time. With other American soldiers of this period, K Company Rangers fought a war against that Communist International conspiracy.

The Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 launched in Russia absolute control by communist commissars and mass genocide such as the world had never seen. Horror and terror on an unprecedented scale was set loose upon the land and it is the model and template used by other totalitarian dictatorships, including those in Nazi Germany, Communist China, North Korea, Cuba, and finally, Viet Nam.

Communist genocide remains covered up in the West….it is barely mentioned by the press and nearly unknown in academic circles and other settings where 'serious' literature is shaped. Nor has there been a cinematic treatment of or documentary about nearly 8 decades communist terror and genocide, either directly or in passing.

Unlike National Socialism (Nazism) which passed away with the Third Reich, "egalitarian socialism" (the soft word for the brand of communism achieved by a more gradual approach) maintains its presence in various forms in all Western nations and carries influence among opinionmakers that defies logic.

In this venue, the American soldier in Viet Nam stood between darkness and light but outflanked by the American fourth estate and fifth column which decidedly and demonstrably remain at cross-purposes to him.

He was asked to transform himself over and again through more than a decade of campaigns, often the victim of opportunists, shortsighted commanders, and those individuals of an entirely different character who were intent on fighting no war at all, only to give victory to the future ghosts of an unseen hand.

But there were those who refused to be manipulated, and they took the battle beyond its intended purpose…and fought to win.

LANDSCAPE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: TAKE THE WORLD

The Comintern or Third International, was founded in Moscow in 1919 to coordinate world communist aggression. Ho Chi Minh was a founding member of this body.

Officially (?) disbanded in 1943, the Comintern was replaced by the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau,1947 to 1954), in which only the Russian Soviet, the ruling East European communist parties (Yugoslavia was expelled in 1948), and the French and the Italian communist parties were represented. Ho Chi Minh was a founding member of the French Communist Party.

The Cominform was officially 'dissolved' in 1956, around the time Fidel Castro and Ho Chi Minh were making war plans - with the help of the Soviet Union - to expand communism by force in Asia, Africa, and in Latin America.

The strategy of choice for Communist aggression everywhere - intimidation, terror, and atrocity against the civilian population - was the North Vietnamese Army mission for conquest of free South Vietnam.

By murdering tens of thousands of civilians - village officials, schoolteachers, and health workers as standard procedure, the communists terrorized potential leaders into flight, inactivity, or submission. This is what Pol Pot accomplished so efficiently in Cambodia in 1975 - 1978. When the Khmer Rouge (Red Cambodians) were finished with 'the revolution,' no one in Cambodia was left alive but communists, survivors, and orphans.

Example: In 1946, after Ho Chi Minh established his troops in Hanoi, there were two indigenous Vietnamese sects in Viet Nam which, because they were also fervently anti-Communist, represented a threat to Ho's plans. He had them exterminated.

Routine murder would not have had the desired terror impact on others. He opted to bury members of the two sects alive in fields, so that only their heads were above ground. He then had harrows driven back and forth across the fields, as one report later described it, to "scratch and tear and chop those living heads like so many small tree stumps as the harrows went over them."

Newsweek magazine for May 15, 1967 reported that "over the past decade the Viet Cong have murdered, mutilated and otherwise brutalized tens of thousands of Vietnamese civilians. And far from attempting to conceal their atrocities, the guerrillas have performed them in the most ostentatious fashion possible."

Readers who acquaint themselves with the historical record of this period would do well to examine the volumes of literature which do not exist on the level of atrocity and crime committed by Ho Chi Minh (and every other communist regime, for that matter) and his comrades.

The Viet Nam War would escalate from 'counterinsurgency' into a conventional war with both sides using full infantry maneuver divisions with armored support and heavy artillery. Only one side, however, was vulnerable to the ravaging poison of treason, but few dared call it that.

TERROR IN THE HIGHLANDS: WHY WE FOUGHT.

In 1969, while future President Clinton evaded the draft and audited his Rhodes Scholar classes at Oxford, he was sponsored by the KGB-controlled British Peace Council to speak against American involvement in Vietnam and to promote the pro-Hanoi view in Europe.

The following events took place in the Highlands of South Viet Nam over the course of that one year: these are examples of Viet Cong revolutionary STRATEGY - not isolated incidents - during 1969:

o March 13th: "Kon Sitiu and Kon Bobanh, two Montagnard villages in Kontum province, are raided by terrorists; 15 persons killed; 23 kidnapped, two of whom are later executed; three longhouses, a church and a school burned. A hamlet chief is beaten to death in front of the villagers. Survivors say the communists' explanation is: 'We are teaching you not to cooperate with the government.'

o August 13th: "Officials in Saigon report a total of 17 communist terror attacks on refugee centers and small villages in Quang Nam and Thua Thien provinces, leaving 23 persons dead, 75 injured and a large number of homes destroyed or damaged."

o August 26th: "A nine-month-old baby in his mother's arms is executed, shot in the head by terrorists outside Hoa Phat, Quang Nam province; also found dead are three children between ages six and ten, an elderly man, a middle-aged man and a middle-aged woman, a total of seven, all shot at least once in the back of the head...as a warning."

o October 27th: "Communists booby trap the body of a People's Self-Defense Force member whom they have killed. When relatives come to retrieve the body the subsequent explosion kills four of them."(From:Douglas Pike, The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror, 1970).

Notwithstanding the deadly farce which played out in America's streets, coffee houses, on the stage and screen, in the open courts and especially in the halls of government, the Vietnam War remained a lethal war of communist aggression from beginning to ignominious end. The Battlefield in Vietnam was abandoned, not lost.

The NVA has never cast off its preferred tactic of terror against a defenseless population.
THE 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION:

In WW I, the 4th Infantry ("Ivy") Division saw proud service in Europe during the campaigns of Aisne - Marine, St. Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne. A generation later, the 4th Division was back on French soil as the D-Day assault force at Utah Beach. After the Normandy breakout, Ivymen fought their war across Europe, first in the drive on Cherbourg, then the liberation of Paris, and in critical action during the battle of the Bulge where they fought with distinction in the Hurtgen Forest and rallied for the last phase of Allied operations against the Werhmacht.

In 1966, the 4th Infantry Division deployed to the Republic of Vietnam and established its base camp in Pleiku Province. Tasked to cut major exit points of the Ho Chi Minh trail that hemorrhaged NVA soldiers and war materiel into the Central Highlands, the 4th Infantry Division fought one of the bloodiest battles of the war in October 1967, at the Battle of Dak To, where Ivymen killed approximately 1,600 NVA soldiers.

Throughout most of 1968, the Division conducted offensive operations against NVA control points around Kontum and Dak To in the Western Highlands. By spring, 1970, the 4th relocated its headquarters to Camp Radcliff, near An Khe, and again went on the offensive during the Cambodian cross-border incursion in May and June of 1970.

In 63 days of fighting in Cambodia, American and ARVN forces, spearheaded by US Special Forces and Army Rangers, left 10,000 dead NVA on this battlefield. Hanoi lost any hope of mounting a major offensive for nearly two years after this appropriate and long awaited attack on their sanctuaries.

The 4th Infantry Division redeployed to CONUS on Dec. 12, 1970, to Fort Carson, Colo.

RANGERS IN THE HIGHLANDS

The K / 75th Ranger Area of Operations - II Corps Tactical Zone - was the largest of any Ranger or LRP/LRRP unit in the Viet Nam War - it covered nearly 30,000 square miles of some of the most forbidding terrain on earth upon which to wage war. Two thirds of this area was mountain jungle.

Map by Shelby Stanton, indicating the Coastal Plains, Mountains, and High Plateau Regions. Circles Indicate Locations of US Army Special Forces Camps

Under the operational control if the 4th Infantry Division, II CTZ stretched from the coastal plains of the South China Sea West to the mountainous, tri-border region that melded jungle forest and high plateau into three countries: Laos, Cambodia, and South Viet Nam.
The operational area of II CTZ:
200 miles (West) along the borders with Cambodia and Laos; 300 miles of mountain slope and coastal plain along the South China Sea in the East, about 150 miles between II CTZ and III CTZ (South), and about 150 miles between II CTZ and I CTZ in the North, I CTZ forming part of the DMZ which separated North and South Vietnam.
With an authorized strength of just over 200 Rangers to cover 30,000 square miles, much was expected of K Company. As forward scouts and in the attack role that defined the term, 'Ranger,' they would perform their mission in exemplary fashion.
THE LONG RANGE PATROL: PENETRATE DEEPER, STAY IN LONGER…
Upon deactivation of it's predecessor LRP company, "E" Company, 58th Infantry (which inherited the Division level Long Range mission from the LRRP (Provisional) company authorized by MG Peers) and activation of the K /75th Rangers, the lineage, duties, honors, and remaining personnel of E/58th and the Brigade LRP and LRRP companies came under operational control of the 4th ID and K Company Rangers.
This unit change was the end result of a process following the first Long Range Patrol missions in support of 4th ID operations in September, 1966, when Major General Arthur S. Collins ordered the establishment of reconnaissance/commando (RECONDO) teams at Battalion and Brigade level.
Although limited in size and scope, the early RECONDO teams proved their worth. In January, 1967, the new 4th Division Commander, MG William R. Peers, expanded the LRP program and organized the RECONDO teams at Division Level as the 4th Division LRRP (Provisional), which remained in service until 20 December 1967.
Having no organic command section, however, 4th Division LRRP (Provisional) - with eight RECONDO and three Hawkeye teams, did not become fully operational until June, 1967. From December '66 to June, 1967, the detachment was commanded and staffed as part of the S-2 (intelligence section), 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, which rendered Helicopter and ready-reaction assets to the LRRP's from the 10th Cavalry's Troop D, 'Aero-Rifle Platoon.'
At the same time, each of the 4th Division's three maneuver Brigades (1st, 2nd, and 3rd) were authorized a 62 member Reconnaissance Platoon (LRRP). Each Platoon was authorized a Headquarters Section consisting of a CO, XO, Operations Sgt., 6 dedicated radio operators, eight RECONDO teams, and three 'Hawkeye," or Hunter/Killer teams.
The Brigade elements became operational during the first week in April, 1967, and participated in the 4th Division operation, "Francis Marion." The Brigade LRP's infiltrated NVA controlled areas to conduct observation and commando missions.
The Long Range mission as it fit the war in Vietnam's Highlands was evolving. Initially, the RECONDO (later "LRRP") teams needed to pre-plot suitable landing zones for the helicopters that would carry them into battle and back out again. This posed a variety of challenges, as the most suitable locations were eventually watched and in some instances, booby trapped by the NVA who were developing countermeasures against the new American tactics.
In addition, potential ambush sites were screened as the teams ranged ahead of regular line units. During Operation Sam Houston, the Division Reconnaissance element was strengthened as the G-2 section saw an opportunity to eliminate or capture NVA couriers, officers, political cadre, and the trail watchers and sentries as US forces entered enemy base areas and sanctuaries.
It was at this time that plans for the 4th Division Sniper School were established. The LRRP's were going to pick them off at long range and engage them at close quarters by direct fire. Morale was high, and volunteers for the LRRP's were not hard to find.

THE HUNTERS
"Hawkeye" Teams were raised by MG Peers to hunt down and kill an elusive enemy wherever he could be found. These 'Hunter Killer' teams required men of singular courage and skill. Each team included at least two Rhade Montagnard tribal members and two Americans. The Montagnard knew the rugged terrain and possessed natural hunting and tracking abilities and jungle expertise. They also had a natural aptitude for hating communists who made the usual depredations against the Montagnard, their families, and their way of life, for decades.
Each Hawkeye team went through a rigorous ten day course for mutual familiarization on a personal/cultural level, and to learn communication, signaling, and survival skills necessary to the mission profile.
Initially, there was a doctrinal separation between RECONDO and Hawkeye deployment, but that difference became blurred in practice and in the fluid battlefield environment of the Highlands. As time went on, teams in the field began to respond to targets of opportunity and increasingly employed hit and run tactics - the 'hasty ambush' - to great effect. The LRRP's were getting good at what they did.
EARLY RECONDO TEAMS
RECONDO teams were trained and tasked for three primary missions: As Scout/Observers along the trail systems, these teams reported on enemy movements and remained unobserved themselves. As Pathfinders, they reconnoitered suitable landing zones for their lifeline Helicopter Support elements and made suggestions for routes of escape and evasion from and to these locations in event of catastrophe or disaster on the deep penetration missions. Finally, the RECONDO teams were used as screening forces to the front and flanks of 4th Division regular infantry line formations to ensure these main units were not themselves ambushed. LRRP's were well received by Infantry commanders and their legend grew among rank and file infantrymen.
Both types of teams became skilled at all these tasks, and as opportunities presented, they became adept at exploiting every battlefield opportunity that arose, often changing the mission to respond to a new opportunity or discovery. The size of each patrol varied according to the mission, and teams of as few as two and as many as eight were sent out. As their capabilities increased, so did the complexity and duration of the LRRP / RECONDO mission.
By June of 1967, 4th Division LRRP assets were being used throughout II CTZ, but extra mission emphasis was placed on Pleiku, Kontum, and Darlac provinces, where there were major exit points of the Ho Chi Minh trail system, where NVA activity was on the rise.
In reality, Hanoi was preparing its forces for the Tet offensive of 1968…
LRRP teams found the enemy in his burrows and dens, and attacked them with direct fire air and artillery strikes. They learned his technique for movement and deployment along his main supply lines, routes of travel, and in staging areas in remote mountain locations and on the high plateaus. Battlefield intelligence was analyzed, exploited, and more missions were planned accordingly.
These Highland mountains (which at their highest elevation just north of the DMZ) reach 6,ooo feet - have extensive ridgelines and are cut with deep ravines, saddles, draws, and smaller hills overlooking the valleys that separate them. They are covered with tropical, canopied jungle.

Beneath the tallest trees, which can grow to 150 feet , are smaller trees maybe half that size, and beneath them, still smaller trees, and nearer to the jungle floor, saw-toothed elephant grass, thick stands of bamboo, brush, and vines that inhibit movement for anything but creatures that slither, hop, or crawl or jump.
This was an area long occupied by the NVA who excavated caves and fortified these regions with bunkers, spider holes, tunnels, trenches, and underground shelters. They also built aid stations, hospitals, mess facilities, Command Posts, and storage depots out of what material they found in the jungle. Everything was well camouflaged. The LRRP's found them anyway.
The extended nature of 4th Infantry Division Operations required LRRP teams to maneuver at far greater distances from supporting units than most other LRRP units in Vietnam. Weather in the mountains was a significant determinant on the deployment, length, resource allocation, and sometimes the success of a mission.
Division LRRP teams were on occasion sent into areas beyond normal radio range, either because of the distance ranged from points of origin, or because of terrain features that inhibited radio communication or made it impossible.
In such situations, the teams were either pulled out, Radio Relay aircraft were employed, or ground teams were pressed into service to keep contact between lost teams and higher headquarters. Eventually, dedicated radio relay teams would be raised within the LRRP and Ranger Companies.
Radio Relay aircraft, however, could not remain on station indefinitely, and their presence over an area for any appreciable length of time was certain to draw attention. Brigade level LRRP teams encountered similar operational impediments, but they had more trouble securing radio relay aircraft due to their status on unit priority ranking.
The battlefield in these highlands was, just by its very nature, unpredictable and fluid, and team leaders on the ground had to make very important decisions without much time for analysis or deliberation to continue their mission.
Between April 6 and October 11, in Operation Francis Marion, the LRRP teams proved the viability and practicality of their mission: During this period, with an average of forty-four operational teams, Division-level Hawkeye and LRRP elements completed 555 missions, produced 366 detailed observations of NVA troop movements, and initiated 82 direct contacts with the enemy, resulting in 90 NVA soldiers killed by direct team fire. During this period, only one American was KIA.
The 4th Infantry Division LRRP (Provisional) had earned its reputation as one of the finest units of its type in Vietnam.
EVOLUTION, PHASE II.
As US Forces gained more experience on the Field of Battle in Vietnam, the Department of the Army and MACV realized the necessity of formalizing the LRRP structure. On 20 December 1967 - on the eve of the Tet offensive of 1968 - the 4th Infantry Division LRRP (Provisional) was reorganized as Company E, 58th Infantry (Long Range Patrol).
In one his final acts as Commanding General of the 4th Infantry Division, Major General Peers, the prime mover of the LRRP concept for the Central Highlands, elevated his provisional RECONDO/Hawkeye forces to an official status as a Long Range Patrol company. The General saw what his men could do, and he knew that, given the proper support and good missions, they could do even more.
SIDETRACKED, BUT NOT SIDELINED:
In January, 1968, Major General Charles Stone took command of the 4th Division. He put his stamp on the LRRP mission by introducing ARVN personnel into the LRP teams of E/58th Inf. It was not a well thought out plan and it was not successful. From 23 April to 21 June, 1968, thirty ARVN personnel were trained and integrated into E/58th LRP teams.
No matter what the actual underlying causes, what was perceived as indifference to the mission, personal conflict among the ARVN themselves and between them and the Montagnard, as well as other troubles, the experiment was over by November, 1968. The ARVN, at least those personnel selected for this program, were unable to equal the earlier success achieved by integrating Rhade tribesmen into the LRRP Hawkeye teams.
THE MISSION CONTINUES
As it wrote its own chapter of the book on jungle mountain warfare in Vietnam, E/58th Infantry (LRP) conducted numerous harrowing but successful Long Range Patrol missions during1968 against a determined foe, who paid tribute to the unit by developing specific countermeasures against the LRP teams deployed in the Highlands. As could be expected, operational deficiencies surfaced on some of the missions, but these were dealt with.
Like all US Forces in Vietnam, the one-year combat rotation policy also affected the LRP's. In addition, the shortage of MACV Recondo School and Ranger School graduates was acutely felt in E/58th, as well as in the Brigade LRP companies, which all needed personnel possessed of the specialized training and proven ability produced by these training programs.
In some instances, LRP teams were led by accomplished Privates First Class, who accepted the responsibility, took control of their teams, performed well, and received promotions. Never underestimate the capabilities of American enlisted men…
On 30 November 1968, Major General Donn R. Pepke assumed command of the 4th Division. Building on past success, a renewed emphasis was placed on the importance of E/58th operations.
Seasoned Army noncommissioned officers were recruited for the LRP Company. Rhade Tribesman, who had once before proved their mettle as loyal allies, were again put on the roles of E/58th Inf. Their native expertise in the mountains, on the trails, and in the ways of the Jungle, plus their experience fighting the NVA - a skill previously demonstrated under MG Peer's command, was again employed to good effect.
E/58th Infantry (LRP) continued to perform valuable LRP support for the 4th Division until it was reorganized under the colors of K Company (RANGER), 75th Infantry (Airborne), on 1 February 1969.
THE AMERICAN RANGER IS BACK…
Under a service-wide reorganization of the combat elements raised, trained, equipped, and deployed by the United States Army, the Department of the Army instituted the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS), which took effect in February, 1969.
As a part of this new system, the creation of a Regiment of Rangers was organized, dedicated, and activated. While there would be no Regimental Headquarters for the Rangers at that time, the Regimental Colors were placed at Fort Benning, Georgia.
The CARS Order as it would impact the Rangers:
(Items have been extracted from original documents dated 6 Feb 1970)
FACT SHEET
SUBJECT: Ranger Companies LTC Sutton/72736 6 February 1970
PURPOSE. To provide information on the change in designation of the Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) Companies to Ranger Companies and the Activation of the 75th Infantry.
FACTS
1. The Army Chief of Staff directed that Ranger replace the term Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) when referring to units of this type. The term Ranger traces its origin to the French and Indian War (Seven Years War) when natives of New Hampshire were recruited by Robert Rogers into nine companies. These Rangers, later to be known as Rogers Rangers, were used as "the chief scouting arm of the British" to procure Intelligence by scouting enemy forces and positions and taking prisoners. It was not until later when the Rangers were used in more offensive roles that the term Ranger took on another meaning. Ranger, therefore, has been returned to the role it was initially intended to signify intelligence gathering.
2. In order to provide a parent regiment for the redesigned Ranger Companies of the Active Army the 75th Infantry (Merrill's Marauders) was activated on 1 January 1969. The 75th Infantry which traces its origin to the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) was considered the most appropriate regiment with which to identify the Ranger Companies.
3. In approving the re-designation of the LRRP units to Ranger units and the activation of the 75th Infantry, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army stipulated the following:
a. Only personnel who have been awarded the Ranger Tab through successful completion of the USAIS Ranger Course will be authorized the Tab.
b. Personnel of the 75th Infantry will wear the patch of the Corps/ Field Force or Field Army to which they are assigned. In the case of separate companies in Vietnam attached to divisions and separate brigades, the division or brigade patch will be worn.
c. There will be no change in the unit designation of National Guard units other than to change LRRP to Ranger.
d. The Ranger Department, USAIS, Fort Benning, Georgia will be designated the custodian of the regimental colors and trophies of the 75th Infantry.
4. The following significant actions have taken place since the redesignation.
a. TOE 7157E and G changed to reflect that all personnel will be parachute and ranger qualified.
b. Approval of a new coat of arms, distinctive insignia and traditional designation for the 75th Infantry.
c. Approval of Special Qualifications Identifier "V" to identify parachute/ranger qualified personnel and the placement of SQI "V" in second priority behind SQI "S" (Special Forces).
d. Approval of a Ranger Enlistment Option whereby qualified applicants may enlist specifically for the 75th Infantry and be assured of training as "an Infantryman or Radio Operator, a parachutist and a Ranger and initial assignment to a Ranger Company upon successful completion of training."
8 Incl.
1. Ranger Companies, U.S. Army
2. Rationale for the Selection of the 75th Infantry
3. Present/Past Unit Designations
4. Official Statement of Lineage and Honors
5. Short History of 75th Infantry
6. Coat of Arms, 75th Infantry
7. Distinctive Insignia, 75th Infantry
8. C4, AR 601210 Enlistment Options

RATIONALE FOR THE SELECTION OF THE 75th INFANTRY "MERRILL'S MARAUDERS"
AS THE PARENT UNIT FOR ALL DA AUTHORIZED LAP/RANGER UNITS
1. In selecting a regiment which would become the parent unit for all DA authorized LRP/Ranger units the following criteria was used:
b. The regiment should be unique in that it was made up of volunteers, who operated behind enemy lines and were successful in all their operations.
c. That the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) would be accommodated.
2. In World War II and Korea the following organizations were considered to be "special mission" units: The Ranger Battalions (lst6th Battalions); and 1st Special Service Force; the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) and the Ranger Companies (lst_5th, 8th and the 8th Army Ranger Company). The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), more commonly referred to as "Merrill's Marauders", was selected as the parent unit for the LRP/Ranger units since the heraldry of the Ranger Battalions, the 1st Special Service Force and the Korean War Ranger Companies has been absorbed by the 1st Special Forces.
3. The 5307th Composite Regiment (Provisional) was organized on 3 October 1943 in the China-Burma-India Theater. On 10 August 1944 the 5307th Composite Unit was consolidated with the 475th Infantry and designated the 475th Infantry (Merrill's Marauders). On 21 June 1954 the 475th Infantry Regiment was redesigned the 75th Infantry (Merrill's Marauders). For World War II.
3. 75th Infantry was awarded two campaign streamers and the Distinguished Unit Citation. Those members of "Merrill's Marauders" who were awarded the Combat Infantry Badge were authorized the Ranger Tab, the only unit other than the Ranger Battalions of World War II authorized the Ranger Tab.*
*[Author's note: the issue of awarding the Ranger tab to the Marauders and Ranger Battalions of WW II in this fashion, and to any person who was awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge while serving during the Korean Conflict with the 8th Army Ranger Company (11 October 1950 to 27 March 1951), but not to the Rangers of the Viet Nam War is historically inconsistent and must be corrected…]
4. An excerpt from American Forces in Action Series, entitles "Merrill's Marauders" illustrates, somewhat, the similarity of missions between the 5307th Composite Unit and the present day LRP/Rangers.
"The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) of the Army of the United States was organized and trained for long range penetration behind enemy lines in Japanese held Burma. Commanded by Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill, its 2,997 officers and men became popularly known as "Merrillls Marauders." From February to May 1944, the operations of the Marauders were closely coordinated with those of the Chinese 22d and 34th divisions, in a drive to recover northern Burma and clear the way for the constructions of the Ledo Road, which was to link the Indian railhead at Ledo with the old Burma Road to China. The Marauders were foot soldiers who marched and fought through jungles and over mountains from the Hukawng Valley in northwestern Burma to Myitkyina on the Irrawaddy River. In 5 major add 30 minor engagements they met and defeated the veteran soldiers of the Japanese 18th Division. Operating in the rear of the main forces of the Japanese, they prepared the way for the southward advance of the Chinese by disorganizing supply lines and communications. The climax of the Marauders operations was the capture of Myttkyina airfield, the only allweather strip in northern Burma."
1. The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional was the first U.S. ground combat force to meet the enemy on the continent of Asia during World War II.
2. On 7 January 1944 the designation "regiment" was changed to "unit".
Major difference between the present day LRP/Ranger companies and the 5307th Composite Unit is that the LRP/Rangers mission is primarily that of intelligence gathering, i.e., Seek-Find-Report, whereas the Marauders had a typical Infantry mission, i.e., Find-Fix-Finish.*
*[author's note: The Marauders didn't have any "Headquarters," in the sense that LRP/Rangers did, to report to: They were all there was in that part of the WW II CBI theatre. In addition, many NVA were found…and 'finished' by direct contact with 75th Infantry Rangers…]
5. The activation of the 75th Infantry in no way disrupts the CARS. However, the following were considered disadvantages which warrant mention:
a. The 75th Infantry has a history which dates back to only 1943. Previous to the activation of the 75th Infantry the LRP units were members of regiments which had a somewhat longer history:
17th Infantry 1861
20th Infantry 1861
50th Infantry 1917
51st Infantry 1917
52d Infantry 1917
58th Infantry 1917
b. The above regiments had a broad mix of infantry battalions, mechanized infantry battalions, infantry rifle companies and LRP companies. The variety of these Infantry units served to enrich the heritage, history and battle honors of the particular regiments they served.
c. Any honors accrued in Vietnam by the LRP companies would have been retained by the parent regiment and would not be carried over to the 75th Infantry. The exception to this rule is the case of the Infantry detachments whose honors and decorations were transferred to the 75th Infantry.
6. The following are the advantages in selecting the 75th Infantry as the parent unit for all DA authorized LRP/Ranger units:
a. Provides the members of LRP/Ranger units with a regiment having a unique place in the annals of the U.S. Army.
b. Provides the members of LRP/Ranger units and the rest of the Army with a common regiment identifying an uncommon skill.
c. Returns to the rolls of the Active Army a regiment having a distinguished combat record which earned it a Distinguished Unit Citation for World War II.
d. Provides the members of the LRP/Ranger units a unit having an active association (Merrill's Marauders Association) which will provide the soldiers a past: history on which to build.
e. Will provide a strong appeal to recruit more soldiers into the Ranger Training Program.
Present and Past Designations 75th INF, and Merrill's Marauders
Rangers in Vietnam conducted long range, covert reconnaissance into denied areas; they collected intelligence on reconnaissance missions; planned and directed air strikes on previously unidentified targets; acted as force multipliers to conventional operations; conducted BDA in enemy controlled areas; executed hunter-killer missions at night or in daylight either by set ambush or by hasty ambush and surprise, and with specially trained and equipped snipers;
In addition, Rangers attempted recovery of friendly POW's; captured enemy personnel for search and interrogation; employed wire tap on the many communication lines used by the enemy in his established base areas and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail Network; and they mined enemy transportation routes.
While the Rangers were all Airborne designated and authorized jump pay, most missions were executed following a helicopter insertion. Only one company, C Co. (RANGER)/75th. Inf. (Airborne) was on active Jump Status, but some Brigade LRP's actually received jump pay.
Notwithstanding, the "Airborne" designation (Ranger assigned personnel carried the "P" for Parachute codicil at the end of their Duty MOS.) would lead to confusion, mostly by non-Rangers and anyone unfamiliar with the Ranger Companies of the Vietnam Era, when the Ranger was not actually parachute qualified. If the Company was ordered to participate in a combat jump, it was expected that everybody would go.
In the 4th Infantry Division, K/75th Rangers conducted Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP's) using 4 and 6 man teams. Occasionally, 8 -12 man heavy teams were inserted for special missions. Ranger teams could stay behind enemy lines for long periods, conducting raids and ambushes whenever possible. Most missions however were of shorter duration, 3 to 9 days, extended as tactical or weather conditions - especially in the Highlands, dictated.
Optimally, Ranger teams were inserted by staging a phony insertion or two along with the real one. With the insertion teams on the slicks, a flight of Hueys with their "Hog" (Huey model Slicks converted to Gunships armed with rocket pods, mini guns and .30 or .50 caliber door gunner machine guns) and Cobra escorts made low passes in several locations to keep enemy spotters guessing where we actually dropped.
Depending on what they saw and how soon they were discovered, Ranger teams could be on the ground from several minutes to a number of days. Ranger missions often ended with "hot" extractions, which meant that the team had been either been discovered or had initiated contact on the way out and was under fire.
Operations personnel, however, could not always plan successfully for these dangerous missions, which were inherently dangerous and to some extent, unpredictable. On occasion, the manner and circumstance of Ranger team deployments exposed the teams to what some team leaders would describe as unnecessary risk. Such is the Soldier's lot.
Ranger units were deployed by helicopter far ahead of American forces. How this was done, and the clandestine nature of the mission, called for special tactics developed over the years by valiant helicopter pilots who had become highly skilled in this type of operation, which was unlike normal airlift operations. This description by a pilot who flew for Special Forces in their long range mission profile is informative:
"For insertions we normally flew a light fire team comprised of two gun ships. For extraction's we flew a heavy fire team of two gun ships and a hog frog. When inserting a team, the decreased firepower was traded for increased speed. The idea on an insertion was that we were in and out before the bad guys had a chance to react. When flying an extraction the NVA often knew what was happening because the team had been compromised, so we needed the aerial artillery that the hog frog added to the fire team…" (from: http://www.281stahc.org/pictures/galer/GalerRR103.html; ROADRUNNER 103; by Rick Geller)

K Company (RANGER), 75TH Infantry (AIRBORNE)

With the new Regiment of Rangers finally activated under CARS, the K Company detachment absorbed the assets and personnel of E/58th Infantry (LRP), and it was placed under the Command of Captain Reuben H. Silverling.
The mission, however, changed little: Like the other Ranger detachments serving in Vietnam, expertise in long range special operations at the tactical level was raised to a new intensity. K/75th Rangers would provide the Division with a long range capability unmatched, at the time, in modern warfare.
In the early days after CARS, K/75th was attached to 1st /10th Cavalry for logistical support (supplies, weapons, etc.) and administration. Operational control remained with Division G-2 (Intelligence) and G-3 (Operations).
With particular emphasis on the Western Highlands in 1969 - from the northern An Lao Valley of Kontum Province, across Pleiku and Darlac Provinces, to Bu Krak in Western Quang Duc Province, K Company Rangers escalated operations against NVA forces that were pouring down the Ho Chi Minh Trail at rates approaching 20,000 soldiers per month.
However, K Company did not operate at full efficiency until the Brigade LRP platoons were finally and fully integrated with the Ranger Company. These three added platoons allowed K Company to reach its authorized strength of 220 members and infused the unit with field-experienced teams, creating a capable, powerful Ranger force.
This much needed consolidation was completed on 6 October 1969, under the Command of Captain Kim H. Olmstead. Now, K Company could field three patrol platoons consisting of a Headquarters section, five five-man Ranger teams and five six-man Hawkeye Teams, the 6th man being a Rhade Scout. Before long, K Company would adopt the 4 man team as standard.
Each team was given an Alpha-numeric designation, such as R-4, R-2, R-12, and so on.
Each Headquarters section created the structure for the platoon, cleared missions for the teams, briefed and debriefed Team Leaders before and after missions (sometimes at Division HQ, when timely information was deemed critical), and staffed an extensive communications element that included dedicated radio relay teams to support teams in the extremely remote and isolated mountain areas. However, in the fluid environment that is a battlefield, regular Ranger teams were frequently pressed into service for radio relay.
The importance of competency in the performance of radio relay missions should not be undervalued. Without a means of contacting "Zero," (the Ranger company HQ section) or of being able to reach the Artillery net, FAC birds, gunships or TAC Air, or to call for extraction, the mission could be compromised and the team could be lost.
Radio relay teams were frequently called on to provide support for several teams operating in conjunction with each other. In such cases, a significant amount of information had to be passed rapidly and accurately. For instance, several fire missions might have to be worked simultaneously, with the relay specialist in communication with both the Artillery and the team(s) needing it.
Team locations needed to be plotted and updated with Defensive Target registrations, and coordination was needed to alert the teams for extraction, requiring the relay teams to be on the radio with the focus team, the extraction choppers and any gun platforms that might be essential in a hot extraction. Throw in all of that, multiply it by several teams, and one can see that radio relay missions were critical assets in the rugged Highland terrain.
Radio Relay teams were often deployed to mountain tops or along ridgelines facing valleys so they could pick up signals from the teams operating below. Although it was desirable to move locations to keep from being discovered by an enemy that was constantly looking for them, radio relay teams couldn't lose communication with the teams that depended on them for their lives. Therefore, they remained on station until the mission was terminated.
Constant personnel turnover plagued K/75th Rangers as much as it had E/58th (LRP) and all the other units in Viet Nam…but the Ranger mission was so specialized and multi-tasked (communications skills, proficiency at map reading, proficiency at directing air strikes, proficiency at using artillery…and so on) that when a teammate or team leader rotated out of the unit, the loss was acutely felt.
An influx of Ranger School graduates in late 1969 improved overall operations but actual school-trained Rangers and RECONDO's remained scarce. However, volunteers from line units, Artillery units, Combat Engineers and even cooks and clerks who wanted to fight were encouraged to train with the company. If they made it past a rigorous training and screening process, they might be asked to become Rangers. Many did so and turned in sterling performances.
In November, 1969, Major General Glenn D. Walker assumed command of the 4th Infantry Division. General Walker decided to turn his Rangers loose on the NVA and he authorized a series of retaliatory raids against them, specifically tasked to K Company Rangers.
For K Company, whose anxious members reveled in any opportunity to strike the enemy, the emphasis on offensive missions raised company morale, aided recruiting, and infused the company with new spirit.
Attention to other details also raised morale in the unit. Always scarce, except for Air Force desk jockeys and mechanics for whom cammies were standard issue, camouflage fatigues were requisitioned for the Company in sufficient supply that the Rangers - who really needed camouflaged uniforms - no longer had to buy them on the black market.
Significantly, at this juncture, the Ranger Black Beret replaced the Australian-style cowboy hat as the Regiment's headgear. For the next 32 years - until 2001 - Rangers were known by their distinctive Black Beret.
In 2001, COS Army, General Shinsheki, in a bizarre series of directives, took the trademark Black Beret from the Rangers and made it the standard headgear for the entire US Army, National Guard, and Army Reserves. Then, he proceeded to purchase several million dollars worth of Berets from Communist China - in violation of US law…
As the emphasis on combat missions increased, the reconnaissance mission was not abandoned by any means. However, the deployment of teams to initiate contacts, set ambushes, and conduct Sniper operations was amplified.
During mid February, 1970, K/75TH Rangers participated in a POW rescue mission called, "Operation Wayne Stab II." Ranger Headquarters pulled all the teams in, refitted, resupplied, and redeployed the whole company as a unit for the first and only time, in a concerted attempt to rescue some American Prisoners of War.
Acting on information that the area contained an NVA base camp that held a POW compound, possibly with the presence of American POW's, the entire company deployed to the field in a one-ship 'Hover LZ' and dug in for the night. No POW's were found.
As time progressed, K/75th Rangers took up what became for them 'routine' 4 and 6 man long range reconnaissance patrols and ambush missions. Occasionally, personnel from several teams would be combined for a 'heavy team' of 8 to 12 men for a special operation. The Company regularly sent out interdiction patrols along enemy infiltration routes, which for some of the Rangers had become familiar territory.
Using state of the art, scoped weapons, Ranger Snipers picked off individual NVA with rifle shots that came out of nowhere, leaving shaken survivors to tell the tale.
The Rangers honed their skills as marksmen at the 4th Division Sniper School (which also trained snipers from other Divisions). In a setting that combined classroom instruction in the science of ballistics, shooting, camouflage and stealth, and with an abundance of live fire range time, Rangers were trained to engage individual targets at long range at night and in daylight. 4th Division Snipers also had to be proficient with iron sights out to 900 meters.
M-21 Rifle System used by US Forces in Vietnam
The Viet Nam Era Sniper weapon, the 'M-21 rifle system,' used a 3x9 power Adjustable Ranging Telescope for day missions and Starlight scopes for night fire Sniper missions. The scopes were ballistically matched to the Match-grade, 7.62mm semi-automatic rifle and ammunition.
M-21 Sniper Rifle configured for night fire with AN/PVS-2 starlight scope
These and many other types of operations were performed with honor and excellence by the men and brought great credit to this unique breed of soldier, to K Company, and to the United Stated Army.
Respect for the Rangers was high in the Division. Chopper pilots and air crew, forward-based artillerymen, truck drivers, the Commanding General, FAC pilots, medical personnel (including Army nurses), grunts in regular infantry line units and just about everybody else spoke with mysterious awe of the "LRRP's."
The declaration, "LRRP's in contact" would send ripples through Artillery FADAC bunkers and batteries of big guns with names like, "Bad News," "Cold Sweat" and "Canned Heat" would elevate their tubes, pack powder, and shove 'Joe's' into their breeches, awaiting the pull of the lanyard that would start a Ranger fire mission. Life and death was on the line.
Air assets would muster - the pilots flight checked their ships and the gunners their weapons. Jet turbines whined and Huey slicks with the doors removed lifted into the sky on the leading edge of wings that chopped at the air. Night or day alike, in bad weather and clear, another impossible feat of airmanship would be performed by crews that earned undying admiration from men whose lives they saved every day simply by doing what they were trained to do.
(Photo at Left: Black Jack '7,' 4th Aviation Bn., 4th Inf. Division, flew in Support of 4th Division LRRP's and K Co. Rangers; Photo at right: Call sign, 'Gator 834,' 4th Aviation Bn., 4th Inf. Division, extracting K Co. Ranger team in the Highlands.)
Every Ranger, however, believed that these were not ordinary pilots… Helicopter Crews that flew Ranger missions in the Central Highlands without doubt ate at God's mess Hall.
As has been said, K Company and the Brigade LRRP and LRP teams that served in the Central Highlands performed Herculean service over an extremely large area of difficult terrain. They served at distances that often precluded artillery, aerial, and communication support that was routinely available to most other Ranger units in Vietnam.
By 1970 - the Year of the Dog - North Vietnam was sending 22,000 troops per month down the Ho Chi Minh Trail…a significant number of them were on their way to the Central Highlands. Many would not reach their intended destinations. Testimony to this fact is the NVA name given to a major spur of the Ho Chi Minh trail that emptied into the Highlands at the northwestern end of the Plei Trap Valley, the "Valley of Tears."
NVA truck movement in the Highlands began shortly after nightfall and normally trailed off about 3:00 a.m. to allow time for the unloading, dispersal, and concealment of supplies and vehicles before daylight. On high alert in the night darkness, the eyes of men with painted faces watched and waited for any miscalculation or laxity in secure movement by the NVA…and make them pay. It was very common for Recon teams to adjust fire on 'lights in the distance' and report secondary explosions from the target area.

The Ranger mission in Viet Nam was to reconnoiter, report on, and engage by direct fire or by other means North Vietnamese Army regulars. By 1968, most Main Force Viet Cong Battalions were comprised mainly of NVA.

Army Rangers and their MACV/SOG counterparts ensured that the NVA commander never felt safe from their prying eyes or from the rain of hot steel that they could cause to descend upon his forces in an instant, at anytime, in anyplace.
Special Forces and Ranger teams complimented each other in their respective, murky missions. The enemy was never quite sure who was on his trail. For communist soldiers who walked into a K Company ambush or fell victim to a Ranger directed air strike or artillery fire mission, the last thing on their minds might be trying to guess what went wrong as they disintegrated from the world in the firestorm of war.

Thus the blueprint for future American military operations was taken from the realm of theory and set into practical application. The concept was sound, and it was proven on the battlefield in Viet Nam:

Small groups of highly skilled and courageous men armed and equipped with the latest weapons and technology, went out to confront an enemy and defeat him against all odds.

They changed the very nature of war…again.

"STAND-DOWN"

Company K and its predecessor LRP units rendered significant service to the 4th Infantry Division in the II Corps Tactical Zone. K/75th Rangers continued field operations in Vietnam until 22 November 1970.

As part of Increment V (Keystone Robin-Bravo) of the US Army redeployment from the Republic of Vietnam, Company K (RANGER), 75TH Infantry (Airborne), was ordered to stand-down.

On the morning of 26 November 1970, Major General William A. Burke, who had assumed command of the 4th Division in July of 1970, mustered his Rangers for their final roll call in Vietnam, and for Command review and decorations ceremony. Captain L. E. Penley, K Company's 2nd and last Company commander, presided as the Rangers were officially reduced to zero strength and deactivated.

Although some of the K/75th Rangers immediately returned home to the USA, others were reassigned to Ranger units still operating in Vietnam "to continue the Mission."

THE END OF THE MISSION IN VIET NAM:

Sadly, the battlefield in Viet Nam was abandoned to the darkness, but not by those who fought and died there for freedom, for Viet Nam, and for each other.

Final Salute at the Tomb of the Unknowns, Arlington National Cemetery, Washington, D.C.

Appendix:

Company K (RANGER), 75TH Infantry (Airborne), is entitled to the following:

Campaign Streamers:

Vietnam
Counteroffensive, Phase VI Tet 69 Counteroffensive
Summer-Fall 1969 Winter- Spring 1970
Sanctuary Counteroffensive Counteroffensive Phase VII

Unit Decorations:

Vietnam:
RVN Cross of Gallantry with Palm; RVN Civil Actions Medal

Traditional Designation: "K" Ranger; Motto: "Sua Sponte"("Of their own Accord")