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L/75 RGR & F/58 LRP & 1/101 LRRP & 3/506 LRRP
& 101 LRS
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The platoon’s mission is that of penetrating enemy territory for route, point, and area surveillance. The concept of operation is to employ small reconnaissance teams within the battalion’s area of operations or a future area of operation being contemplated by the Brigade. A team is usually employed for a period of 5 days, but will vary according to the current tactical situation. The platoon was originally organized by 2/Lt Joel S. Stevenson and Platoon Sergeant Philip R. Chassion in August 1965, under the MTOE 57-42F. At this time the person ell were recruited and outfitted with both weapons and material. September 1965 saw a training program initiated and the first team was tactically employed in October, 1965. Since October 1965, the platoon has been employed in all the Brigade’s tactical operations. The original LRRP personnel were Lt. Stevenson, PSgt Chassion, SFC Guy Tomlinson, Sgt Donovan Pruit, Sgt David Skau, and SFD Larry Forest as Platoon Leader, Platoon Sergeant, and Team Leaders respectively. May 1966 saw 1/Lt Robert Deason assume command until July. On 14 August 1/Lt Robert L. Friedrich OF100676 accepted the command. The platoon sergeants for 1966 were SFO Billy C. Eury, RA24989581, SSG Tommy R. Russell, RA18376513, and MSG Fransisco Acevedo, RA50101448. The platoon’s organization consisted of 1 officer and 34 enlisted men, which was further organized into a platoon headquarters section and four reconnaissance teams. The headquarters section consisted of platoon leader, Platoon Sergeant, Operation Sergeant and assistant, communication chief and assistant, plus a light truck driver. The reconnaissance team’s organization consisted of a team leader, 2 reconnaissance scouts, 2 scouts with additional communication duties, and 2 scouts also doubling as the team’s medics. The communications system was composted of 1 each AN/GRC 46 and 2 each PRC/25 radios in the headquarters sections. Each team was equipped with an AN/PRC-74 and 2 each AN/PRC-25 radios. These radios gave the platoon internal communications among the teams while one or all of the teams were employed in the field. Each team was also able to maintain communications with the platoon headquarters. Throughout the year the teams were inserted into their area of operation by either heliborne assault, ground infiltration, or amphibious means. The teams were also qualified and capable of executing an airborne insertion. To increase the effectiveness of this platoon a new concept has been formulated by Captain Friedrich (promoted 17 November 1966), and is planned to become operational the first quarter of 1967. Basically, the teams would be reorganized into a section concept of organization and will have two scouts who will be sniper trained and equipped. These 2 scouts will be added to present team organization. Two RTO’s will also be an addition to each team. Thus, the present six-man teams will become a ten-man section. This section would still be employed under the same tactical concept as the present team. A more significant change will occur in the headquarters section which will consist of the addition of an operation officer, communication repairman, 2 each of RTO’s and 1 armorer. One RTO would also be assigned the additional duty as the light truck driver. The concept of operation and methods of insertion will remain the same. However, the platoon would increase its capabilities to patrol and recon a larder area and also to engage small enemy forces or targets of opportunity. The new concept will increase the platoon’s strength to two officers, and fifty-nine (59) enlisted men. As a result of enemy engagement throughout 1966, the platoon members received 1 Silver star, 29 Bronze stars for Valor, 4 Army Commendations for valor, 10 purple hearts, and 25 Air Medals. (The awards and decorations section contains the names of the individuals who received the Bronze Stars with “V” and the Silver Star). Key personnel of the original 1st BDE. LRRPs. Plt. Ldr. Lt Stephenson Plt. Sgt. SFC Chassion Team Ldrs. SSgt. Pruitt SSgt. Skau SFC. Tomlinson SSgt. Forrest Commo Sgt. SSgt. Bourne
Company “F”, 58th Infantry was constituted on 15 May 1917 and organized on 5 June 1917 at Gettysburg National Park, Pennsylvania, as an element of the 4th Division. During the next 50 years the unit did not remain on continuous active duty but was inactivated and reactivated at its services were needed. Its service was notable. It was deeply involved in both World War I and World War II and it participated in six combat campaigns. The latest activation for the company was on 10 January 1968. The activation was in the Republic of Vietnam and the company is presently engaged in the military conflict there. This history covers the period from 10 January 1968 to 1 January 1969. The primary references used were the intsums of the combat operations during the year and notes written periodically throughout the year by the company’s commanders and other personnel involved in the company’s operations. LINEAGE AND HONORS COMPANY “F”, 58th INFANTRY Constituted 15 May 1917 in the Regular Army as Company “F”, 58th Infantry Organized 5 June 1917 at Gettysburg National Park, Pennsylvania, as an element of the 4th Division Inactivated 21 June 1922 at Fort George Wright, Washington Demobilized 31 July 1922 (concurrently, 58th Infantry relieved from assignment to the 4th Division) Reconstituted 8 April 1942 in the Regular Army as Company “F”, 58th Infantry Activated 24 April 1942 at Fort Lewis, Washington Reorganized and redesignated 26 January 1944 as Company “B”, 204th Infantry Battalion Inactivated 8 March 1945 at Camp Shelby, Mississippi Redesignated 30 September 1948 as Company “B”, 43rd Armored Infantry Battalion Activated 28 January 1949 at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, as an element of the 2nd Armored Division Inactivated 1 July 1947 in Germany (concurrently, 43rd Armored Infantry Battalion relieved from assignment to the 2nd Armored Division) Redesignated 1 July 1959 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 5th Battle Group, 58th Infantry Redesignated 10 January 1968 as Company “F”, 58th Infantry; concurrently, activated in Vietnam. COMPANY “F”, 58TH INFANTRY CAMPAIGN PARTICIPATION CREDIT World War I Aisne-Marne St. Mihiel Meuse-Argonne Champagne 1918 Lorraine 1918 World War II-AP Aleutian Islands Vietnam To Be Determined 1968 SUPPLEMENT TO COMPANY “F”, 58TH INFANTRY UNIT HISTORY THE YEAR AT A GLANCE
The activation of company “F”, 58th Infantry occurred in the Republic of Vietnam on 10 January 1968. The personnel comprising the company were drawn largely from two sources-the cadre of Fort Campbell’s renowned RECONDO school who had arrived in-country during the two previous months, and personnel form the 101st Airborne Division’s First Brigade’s Long Range Reconnaissance Platoon (LRRP). Thus the personnel were well trained and suited to perform their assigned mission of conducting long range patrols. However, because the 101st Airborne Division had just recently arrived in-country and was facing the monumental job of establishing itself, both in a semi-permanent location and as a well functioning fighting team, Company “F”, 58th Infantry, better known as the Division LRRPs, was called on to perform numerous functions other than long range patrolling and it was not until 4 May 1968 that the first long range patrol was conducted.
Shortly after its official activation the LRRP Company moved from its headquarters at Bien Hoa Army Base to the city of Song Be to assist in securing that city. By 28 January 1968 the company was again at Bien Hoa, and two six-man teams were dispatched with General Clay, the Assistant Division Commander, to help locate and secure a new area for the division. The remainder of the company became involved in repelling the enemy’s TET offensive in the Bien Hoa area. Shortly after TET the company moved t join its two teams in securing what was to become the Division’s base camp, Camp Eagle, near the city of Hue. During the ensuing two months the company was primarily involved in assisting in providing security for the quickly developing base camp.
May 4, 1968, marked the beginning of long range patrol operations for the company. A six-man patrol, led the 1LT John W. Gay, Jr., was emploged into the mountainous jungles north-west of fire support base Birmingham. Two hours later, after killing one and possible three VC/NVA the team was extracted. This mission turned out to be a harbinger of the action the company was to see for the rest of the year. During the next eight months the company successfully completed 124 long rage patrol missions. The information obtained contributed immeasurably to the Division’s intelligence effort, and on these missions a total of 62 enemy were killed by body count, and a larger but undetermined number was killed by air strikes and artillery called in by the teams. Loss of company personnel due to enemy action was five killed and 14 wounded during the year.
Additionally, concurrent with the long range patrol missions the LRRP Company performed numerous close-in security type ambushes for the Division, provided reaction forces for the Division as needed for general security and for responding to the needs of high ranking officials should the occasion arise, and it trained Division personnel in repelling and in the use of the McGuire Rig.
In summation, Company “F”, 58th Infantry throughout 1968 was totally committed to the military effort in Vietnam, and its performance was commendable in every aspect.
1
Company “F”, 58th Infantry upon its activation on 10 January 1968 found itself located at the Bien Hoa Army Base in the Republic of Vietnam. Most of the personnel were the cadre of Fort Campbell’s RECONDO school who had flown by C141 to Bien Hoa only within the preceding two months, and members of the First Brigade’s Reconnaissance Platoon. The time prior to the activation was spent establishing the company as a working unit and in refresher training covering all areas needed to be known for the special mission of performing long range patrols – from repelling to immediate action drills. So the prospects for the year 1968 were bright. The men, although few had prier combat experience, were well trained and confident and moral was high.
Although the men were anxious to begin performing long range patrol missions the needs of the Division were such that this event would be postponed until 4 May. Shortly after the official activation the company boarded C-130s at the Bien Hoa airfield and headed for song Be to assist in securing that city. Soon after arrival the first ambush team was sent out and for the next two weeks the company provided the city security by sending out ambushes and close in reconnaissance missions. Helicopter support was limited at this time so all missions were conducted within easy walking distance of the perimeter. During this period the company received its first casualty when an enemy mortar round killed one and wounded two company members.
On 21 January the company began its move to return to Bien Hoa to rejoin the 101st Airborne Division which was formulating relocation plans. But shortly after the first half of the company departed Song Be the city came under enemy attack. This was the beginning of the communist TET offensive and it was seven days before the company was again reunited at Bien Hoa. During the TET offensive the company member at Song Be saw a considerable amount of action. They received rocket, mortar and RPG rounds, and at one point during the ground fighting assisted in repelling the enemy from a quad 50 position which they had overrun. By the 28th of January the enemy had retired and the half of the company at Song Be returned to Bien Hoa.
At Bien Hoa the company began to perform security missions for the Division and General Clay, the Assistant Division Commander, took two six-man teams with him to help locate and secure a new area for the Division. These teams accompanied General Clay in his C-130 to Quang Tri, DaNang, and finally Phu Bai. In the Phu Bai area they provided security at a temporary base established near Gia Le, and accompanied General Clay in his survey of the surrounding area.
The decision was made to move the 101st Airborne Division to the Hue area. During the Communist TET offensive Hue was occupied by the communists for 27 days and the enemy threat was strong in the area. Company “F”, 58th Infantry was one of the first units sent. The company joined the two teams already in the area and secured the area which was to become Camp Eagle. In doing so they killed four enemy who had approached their parameter.
For the next two months the company was deeply committed to providing security for the Division’s rapidly developing base camp. Its primary missions included providing close in ambushes and daily clearing of the road connecting Camp Eagle and Highway 1. On one occasion elements of the company responding to an enemy ambush of an American truck on this road killed one fleeing enemy.
During this period the men of the company found it does get cold in Vietnam. They had left Bien Hoa in such a hurry they took with them only what they would immediately need. The 1968 Monsoon season was unusually cold and the men found the damp cold air went right through their light jungle fatigues. The unquestioned conclusion was that reports that Vietnam is always hot were grossly in error.
In addition to learning that Vietnam is not all sweat the men learned that not just any bunker will survive the monsoon rains, and during a two week period the most respected man in the company was SSG Richard Burnell whose bunker remained sound and dry while all other bunkers, if they did not wash away entirely, were reduced to mudholes.
Good weather follows bad, however, and with the good weather came a change in the company’s operations. Helicopters were assigned to the company and on 4 May the company conducted its first long range patrol.
The company finally had started to function in its intended capacity. That is, sending six-man teams deep within the jungles, far from friendly ground troops, with the assigned mission of reconnaissance primarily, but occasionally to attempt to snatch prisoners or to conduct ambushes. The helicopter was used for insertion and extraction. Five helicopters were used – the lift ship, a chase ship, two gun ships, and a Command and Control ship. The company was under the operational control of ACofS, G-2 and the five helicopters were assigned to the company whenever the company was engaged in missions. The pilots and crews were from the 160th Aviation Group, the “Black Widows” and the “Kingsmen” and they were truly both proficient and professional. They lived at the LRRP company when assigned and a rapport quickly developed. They became integral members of the “team” and were deeply respected and appreciated by every member of the company.
The company’s first long range patrol mission showed the company’s promise for the future, and set the pace for the rest of the year. The patrol was led by 1LT John W. Gay, Jr. into the mountainous area north-west of fire support base Birmingham in the vicinity of coordinates YD 677153. Their mission was to confirm sniffer readings in the area. The team was inserted at approximately 1300 hours. They were detected shortly after landing on the LZ and called in gunship strike at 1320 hours on three VC/NVA that they spotted overlooking the LZ. Since their presence had been detected they were extracted at 1450 hours. The result was one VC/NVA killed (by bodycount) and probably two others, but the bodies could not be spotted from the air. The team definitely confirmed the sniffer reading.
The following day two more teams were inserted out further to the west. Both teams were extracted under emergency conditions during the next two days with negative friendly casualties and two more VC/NVA killed.
In the following months many more missions were conducted with similar results. SSG James Johnson became known as “Contact Johnson” because on every mission he led he found the enemy. On two occasions he discovered enemy base camps, one was of battalion size, and called in airstrikes and artillery on them. Other teams were also finding the enemy, however, and the company became a prime source of intelligence for the Division G-2. The teams worked throughout the Division AO in the areas west of Hue and Camp Eagle all the way out to the A Shau Valley and south to the 85 east-west grid line and north to the 30 east-west grid line. Information of enemy movements, base camps, trail networks, bunker complexes, weapons and rocket firing positions were continuously reported. The company operated generally with three teams in the field at one time and it was found that normally a team could cover about two-thousand square meters in a three day period, and that became the average length of the missions.
On 25 June one platoon from the First ARVN Division’s Reconnaissance Company was made OPCON to the LRRP company. They moved into an area adjacent to the company area and a one week training program was immediately initiated. The ARVNs were quick to grasp the concepts used by the LRRPs and they proved themselves very capable soldiers. In the next two and a half weeks a total of six teams consisting of two ARVNs and four Americans were sent out, with the American Team Leaders in charge. The ARVN’s knowledge of the jungle proved a helpful contribution to the missions. On 19 July, however, the ARVN platoon was recalled to join its company.
The company 3 October was removed from the control of the G-2 and attached to the 2/17th Cavalry, and shortly thereafter moved to a new location on Camp Eagle. Construction of the new company area was accomplished in conjunction with LRRP missions and it was a busy time for all involved. Under the control of the 2/17th Cavalry the company’s commitments increased. Five and as many as eight teams were sent out on missions at one time. The company continued its exceptional performance with an increased number of enemy sightings and enemy kills.
On 19 November the company received its first casualty on a long range patrol mission. A twelve man team had sprung an ambush on ten VC/NVA and killed nine of them, one having escaped. After searching the bodies and confiscating the enemy’s weapons and documents they carried, the team moved a short distance away and began to prepare for extraction. As the point man began to move toward the LZ he was hit in four places with enemy automatic weapon’s fire. The team quickly returned suppressive fires and pulled the wounded man into the hastily established perimeter and became deeply engaged in a fire fight with the undetermined sized enemy force. During the battle an explosion, presumed to be a CHICOM claymere mine, killed four and wounded seven of the team members. A reaction force of two LRRP teams was immediately sent into assist the team in trouble, followed by the Aero rifle platoon of the 2/17th Cavalry. Before everyone was extracted and air strikes called in thirteen of the reaction force were wounded. Enemy casualties were twenty known dead, and many more presumed so.
On 5 December 1968, the Chief of Staff, United States Army, approved
the activation of the 75th Infantry as the parent regiment for all
Department of the Army Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LRRP) units
and the parenthetical designation (Ranger) in lien of (LRRP) for these
units. On 1 January 1969 the 75th Infantry (Merrill's Marauders) was
restored to the active roles of the US Army as a parent regiment under
the Combat Army Regimental System serving in the Republic of
Vietnam.
With this Department of the Army directive, the LRP Company of the
101st Airborne Division, Company F (LRP), 58th Infantry was
deactivated and these individuals formed under the new designation as
Company L (Ranger) 75th Infantry on 1 February 1969.
The year of 1969 saw the company rise in a degree of professionalism
to make it one of the most efficient, accurate intelligence gathering
sources in the Division. With the reorganization of the company from F
Company (LRP) 58th Infantry to Company L (Ranger) 75th Infantry, the
company's mission became strictly that of intelligence gathering.
Freed from duties of security type ambushes, providing security for
downed helicopters, and reaction forces as needed by the Division for
general security; the company concentrated 100 percent on
reconnaissance.
During 1969 the company conducted 310 Long Range Patrols, almost
twice the number as the previous year, accounting for 21 enemy killed,
and a larger undetermined number killed and wounded from the
supporting fires of gunships, artillery and TAC Air directed by the
teams.
The enemy was visually encountered and observed by patrols in as many
as 100 occasions. Teams directed the fires of gunships and artillery
as many as 200 times throughout the year. In addition to the visual
sightings the company's teams continued to provide the Division with
an immeasurable amount of information concerning enemy movements and
concentrations, along with a vast amount of terrain information such
as LZ locations, water sources and the like.
Loss of company personnel due to enemy action was 5 killed and 14
wounded.
The company additionally conducted rappelling and McGuire Rig
training for the Division.
When inclement weather forced the closing of the outlying firebases
due to re-supply problems, Co L found itself in a new role, that of
working sometimes as far as 70 KM from Camp Eagle, depending on 175
Howitzers firing at maximum range for support and fair to poor or no
communications.
In summation, Co L (Ranger) 75th Infantry continued to be the eyes
and ears of the Division, reporting enemy activities throughout the
Division Area of Operations. The Company's achievement and performance
were admirable in every respect.
Due to poor weather and a lack of cover, there were a limited amount
of Long Range Patrol missions conducted during the first three months
of the year. During this period the Company also conducted close in
security type ambush missions and downed aircraft security.
On March 27, 1969, three Ranger teams led by SGT William L. Marcy
combined to alert FSB Jack of an impending attack by a large enemy
force. Under the direction of SGT Marcy, the team engaged the enemy
with claymores, hand grenades and small arms, to disrupt their route
of march. Using a C-47 gunship and Aerial Rocket Artillery, they
further impeded the enemy's progress. Shortly after daylight the enemy
tried to withdraw and were pursued by fire that was directed by the
teams. A sweep of the teams perimeter revealed three enemy casualties
from small arms fire. The teams were cited for preventing a successful
large scale attack on the firebase and SGT Marcy was awarded the
Silver Star.
The company suffered it's first causality of the year on April 27,
1969, when Julian D. Dedman was in a helicopter that was hit by ground
fire, exploded and burned. Another helicopter incident took the life
of Keith W. Hammond on May 5, 1969 during an extraction in the Ruong
Ruong Valley. The month of May was to see two more Rangers loose their
lives in performance of their duties. On May 8,1969, two teams led by
SSG Zochak and SGT Reynolds, combined to discover a large Sapper
Training Area. After photographing the area, the teams were in a halt
waiting for an aerial relay, when they were engaged by an enemy force
approximately five times their size. During the ensuing fight Sgt
Reynolds was mortally wounded and several other Rangers suffered
wounds of less serious nature. SSG Zochak took charge of the situation
and directed the fires of the team and supporting aircraft while
caring for the wounded himself. By the time the reaction force had
arrived, Rangers had accounted for twelve enemy KIA, and possibly a
greater number wounded.
SGT William Marcy was killed by enemy small arms fire on May 20,
1969, in the late evening hours while exposing himself to call for
artillery on enemy locations.
The month of June 1969 saw the arrival of the ARVN Division Recon
Platoon to the Company. Joint operations were conducted during this
month. Patrols led by SSGT Meiners and SGT Clossen resulted in 3 NVA
KIA. In both incidents the ARVN's performed well, but the language
barrier proved to be quite a problem.
A patrol led by SGT Anderson on 26 June 1969, discovered 31 122mm
rockets along the Song Bo river. A reaction force was brought in to
evacuate the items.
July saw the arrival of CPT Robert A. Guy and the concept of
saturation patrolling. Ranger teams were in employed in clusters of 5
and 6 teams to completely saturate an area.
During the ensuing months the patrols continued to report on enemy
movements, concentrations, and sightings throughout the Division Area
of Operations.
In August, 3 successive patrols led by SGT Gerald Dotson engaged the
enemy with their organic weapons. In the same general area, the
Tennessee Valley, a patrol led by SGT Anderson and SGT Peterson
engaged 5 NVA across a river from them with gunships. An ARVN sweep of
the area in the following days revealed 5 NVA KIA.
On 23 October 69, a patrol led by SGT Dennis Karalow and SGT Edward
Drozd ambushed 3 NVA resulting in 1 enemy KIA and 2 wounded. A search
of the KIA revealed a weapon and several important documents.
On 26 October 1969, SGT David L Bennett engaged 1 NVA, and the team
itself was engaged on 3 sides by and unknown size enemy force. While
attempting to break contact, one team member, PFC Lytle, drowned while
crossing a river.
On 3 November 1969, a heavy team led by SSG Bruce T. Black engaged 3
NVA, killing one and forcing the others to flee. Rucksacks picked up
by the team contained a total of 22 60mm mortar rounds. The next day
the team again engaged the enemy resulting in 1 NVA KIA by the
detonation of a claymore mine.
December saw the Company patrols continue to operate far out in the
Division's recon zone, depending on 175 Howitzers for support. Because
of the bad weather air support could not always be counted upon. SSGT
Solko set a company record when his patrol spent a total of 10 days in
the field before the weather cleared sufficiently for the team to be
extracted.
On the 17th and 19th of December, SGT Luchow and SGT Braciszewski
made contact with the enemy and because of low ceilings and visibility
had to rely on 175's to break contact.
The company entered the 70's with the same determination to
accomplish its mission and devotion to duty that characterized its
1969 performance.
Company L (Ranger) continued to show throughout 1970 the esprit and
professionalism that have characterized its operations since its
incipience. The year barely got under way when on the morning of 1
January 1970, heavy Ranger team Shelby, under the leadership of SGT
"Mad Dog" Macchisio, found themselves surrounded by NVA/VC. The team
initiated contact killing one NVA/VC, and fought its way to the LZ
where it engaged and killed another NVA/VC. An Areo-rifle platoon of
Delta Troop 2/17 Cav was inserted while team Shelby's four WIA were
extracted. A sweep of the area by the Delta platoon and the rest of
team Shelby revealed several heavy blood trails.
This kind of close support with the air cavalry has been the key to
success in many Ranger operations. On 24 January Range team Cortina,
led by SGT "Bugs" Moran, utilized this support well. While working in
the Khe Shan plains the team was taken under fire by a regular NVA
unit. Although the teams small arms accounted for 2 NVA KIA, the NVA
continued to maneuver against the team. The interdiction of a cobra
gunship dampened the aggressiveness of the NVA. On the second pass
screaming and yelling was heard from the enemy locations and soon
thereafter movement stopped all together. The team was extracted
without incident shortly thereafter. Another team working that area
during the same time period also ran into well equipped and trained
NVA elements. Ranger team Opel, led by SSG "Lobo" Bates monitored
several dogs, flashlights and what sounded to be stationary internal
combustion engines. The NVA began searching the area hoping to flush
out the team when gunships were utilized to cover the area. The team
engaged one NVA who had approached too near their location and
received several frags on their perimeter resulting in 2 US WIA. The
small arms continued until C Troop 2/17 Cav was inserted. Prior to
extraction, team Opel was able to inflict at least three KIA on the
enemy which was said to number anywhere from 15-20 NVA.
February of 1970 brought similar reconnaissance intelligence reports
from Co L with but a few exceptions notable. One of these was heavy
Ranger team Baboon, which had the primary mission objective of
prisoner snatch. The team observed heavy enemy activity in the area
and in the third day, by the direction of the team leader, SSGT Black,
moved into an ambush for the PW snatch. Approximately 30 minutes after
setting up the ambush 2 NVA were spotted moving toward the ambush
zone. The Rangers sprung the ambush resulting in 1 NVA KIA and 1 NVA
POW. A reaction unit from 2/17 Cav was called in to secure the team
and its POW and the whole element was extracted five hours after the
ambush had attained success.
March also brought a new aspect of Ranger operations to the
forefront. Not only did Company L (Ranger) conduct 33 regular
reconnaissance missions but also a raid to the Ashau Valley floor.
Under the leadership of CPT Guy, company commander, and 1LT Ohle, 2nd
Platoon Leader, two teams - Ranger Team North and Ranger Team Center,
each comprised of 18 Rangers and 5 Engineers, CA'ed to strategic
locations in the Ashau. The teams found signs of very recent activity
to include tracks of earth moving equipment and sightings of NVA
construction workers. One team destroyed one bridge and nearby
protective bunker while the other team secured a downed 2/17 Cav
aircraft and surveyed the road for possible interdiction points. The
road showed signs of heavy of heavy foot and truck traffic within 24
hours but due to the element of surprise and the swiftness with which
the raids were executed the enemy could not react.
April saw the introduction of several innovations to Ranger
operations at Company L. The basic emphasis for the Ranger mission was
change from reconnaissance to combat intelligence. Company L also
integrated sensor monitoring with their teams with some very favorable
results. The third change in Company L operations took the form of
experimental US-ARVN recon patrols. A group from the 54th Recon
Company, 2nd Regiment, 1st ARVN Division received training at Company
L and joint operations were employed in the ARVN recon zone. The teams
were out with a US Ranger team leader and were quite educational to
all concerned.
By the end of April on to May 1970 emphasis was place on heavy teams
and on having these elements maintain 50% security during their ONH.
One such heavy team, Ranger team Grasshopper headed by SSGT "El Cid"
Sands was working the Khe Sahn plains region when it became locked in
a fire fight with an NVA/VC element of undetermined size. The team
broke contact at 1700 hours after having received 2 US WIA and was
heading for the LZ when it again made contact resulting in 1 US KIA, 1
US WIA and 2 NVA/VC KIA. The team could not move so it stayed in
position and was re-supplied hand grenades and white phosphorous
grenades by LOH. Both the Pink team supporting the Grasshoppers and
the Medevac attempting to extract the wounded received heavy automatic
weapons fire. Finally at 0245 hours the following morning Ranger team
Grasshopper was extracted by ladder under fire. Just prior to
extraction 2 NVA/VC were killed when they attempted to turn around one
of the teams claymore mines.
May of 1970 brought Company L's first big tragedy. Ranger team
Kansas, while working as a radio relay and reconnaissance team in the
Roung Roung valley area observed only slight movement in their area of
operations. At 0430 on the morning of day 4 the situation report sent
to Ranger TOC was negative. This was the last communication anyone had
with team Kansas. At 0800 a Pink team dispatched to the location
spotted six bodies which were recovered by ground Cavalry forces.
Investigation showed that one radio and all weapons had been taken
from the bodies and claymore wires had been cut. No expended US brass
was found in the ONH.
Rather than allow this setback to destroy the morale and aggressive
spirit of the Ranger Company, the men in Company L took this bitter
lesson learned and continued to "Lead the Way" for the 101st Airborne
Division. During the month of July 1970 the company conducted 31
missions with emphasis again placed on reconnaissance intelligence.
Due to the fact that major NVA units were infiltrating the 101st recon
zone, the company concentrated its efforts on possible routes of march
in the Khe Sahn plains.
One such team was heavy team Ferrari led by SSGT "Zee" Zentner. As
team Ferrari moved off the LZ they immediately received heavy fire
from three sides. The team returned fire killing four NVA. In the
ensuing battle the C&C, Cobras and Loch's received heavy 12.7mm
fire and .30 cal fire. In the immediate vicinity 45 bunkers were
observed and an OD generator with wires leading in all directions was
spotted. Two groups totaling 70 NVA were seen moving toward the
contact. Aerial Rocket Artillery accounted for at least 9 NVA KIA. The
team was finally extracted having suffered 6 US WIA.
In addition to running 31 regular reconnaissance missions during
July, Company L (Ranger) graduated three classes of ARVN HAC BAO from
specialized training which it conducted. At the conclusion of the
course each class completed a 36 hour combat patrol accompanied by
four Ranger advisors. Company L (Ranger) still enjoys a close
camaraderie with the famed HAC BAO Company.
During the month of August Company L provided extensive intelligence
reports to the 101st Airborne Division enabling it to pinpoint the
missing Chi Thicu Sapper Battalion and to confirm the suspected
infiltration the 5th NVA Regiment from Laos through Tennessee and
Spear valleys. Often the cost of such intelligence was high - and
might have been higher had not the Rangers had the full support of the
2/17 Cavalry.
Ranger team Kenya was very grateful for the Cavalry support it
received. On their initial infiltration point, the helicopter received
heavy small arms fire and crashed on the LZ. At this time SGT "Lazy
Day" Hazelton, the Team Leader, requested a heavy Pink Team and Blues.
The team continued to receive a heavy barrage of small arms and two
mortar rounds went off on the LZ. Team Kenya suffered 2 US KIA and 2
US WIA but maintained tactical integrity for 45 minutes until the
Aero-rifle platoon of Charlie Troop 2/17 Cav came to reinforce them.
The C Trp ARP's suffered 2 KIA and 1 WIA on the insertion but held
their ground until D Troop 2/17 came to the assistance of the combined
element.
Another team encountering stiff resistance to reconnaissance
gathering patrols was Ranger team Buffalo headed by SSG "Paul Bunyon"
Suomela. Ranger team Buffalo had been hearing and observing may
indications of enemy activity in their area when on the evening of day
4 of the patrol they were approached by several large lights from the
North and East. They were subsequently surrounded by a platoon - sized
element which began firing on a Pink Team that had come to assist
Buffalo. The team threw frag grenades and fired small arms on the NVA
position. All ARA and gunships in the area received heavy 12.7mm fire.
At 0230 hours the next morning the team heard an Air Force fast mover
supporting their element take fire and crash. The next day Buffalo was
extracted without incident after having conclusively determined the
presence of a large enemy element in that area.
Company L (Ranger) continued to saturate the lower Ashau Valley and
Sung Bo Rao Trang Valley with reconnaissance teams all through the
early monsoon period. At times weather became so prohibitive that
truck insertions were made. The company however remained effective and
continued to provide valuable intelligence information to
Division.
One such team, Ranger team Savannah, led by SSG "Termite" Vanning,
while acting both as a reconnaissance element and radio relay for
other Ranger teams, confirmed the presence of Phou Loc Finance and
Economy Company in their area. Team Savannah, shortly after insertion
saw one of their trip flares ignite and employed artillery resulting
in 2 secondary explosions. On day two the team observed 9 NVA/VC in
rain gear and engaged them with organic weapons resulting in 1 NVA KIA
and 5 blood trails. The body revealed several documents which were the
primary source of the intelligence data on the Finance Company. Later
that evening the team observed 1 NVA crawling toward their position
and dispatched his with small arms and grenades resulting in another
NVA KIA. Savannah then observed a light shinning on the body of the
previous KIA and engaged it with organic weapons with unknown results.
Shortly thereafter the team was extracted with their intelligence
items.
The month of Nov 1970 was a particularly hard one weather-wise and
the Ranger Company was only able to field 13 missions. Those teams,
shifted to the Roung Roung Valley due to flying conditions, still
provided timely intelligence reports. One of these teams, Ranger team
Bills, headed by SSG "Spear" Houser determined the location of the
1/803rd NVA Regiment. Unfortunately for this information, Company L
(Ranger) was to pay heavily. On day 4 of their mission the Bills made
chance contact resulting in 1 US WIA immediately. The NVA maneuvered
to within 30 meters of the Bills hasty perimeter and continued to fire
for approximately 10 minutes. At the end of this time the team leader
stated he suspected he was being surrounded. Again the enemy initiated
fire this time wounding another Ranger. The team began employing
artillery in the area until gunships could get on station. The bird
attempting to McGuire one of the wounded Rangers out took heavy fire
wounding several inside the helicopter and the Ranger in the McGuire
Rig fell out and hit the trees. At this time (three hours after
contact) the 2/17 Cav Blues hit the ground and linked up with Ranger
team Bills. The combined element searched the area for the fallen
Ranger and shortly thereafter recovered his body. Before final
extraction of the team could be completed another Ranger was killed by
an RPG.
December's weather proved to be no better than November but with
occasional breaks the Ranger Company was able to complete 10 missions
with emphasis on the Khe Sahn plains (Vietnamese Salient Area) and
eastern Ashau Valley region.
The former location caused additional problems in communications and
control. In order to alleviate these conditions Company L established
a Forward Operations Base at Quang Tri with a radio relay team at
Signal Mountain (950). These missions were run in conjunction with A
Troop 2/17 Cav and personnel stayed with Papa Company (Ranger) 5th
Mech who are also located at QT.
In retrospect one can easily see that L Company (Ranger) has
continued to provide timely and accurate intelligence data to the
101st Airborne Division by aggressive and professional Ranger
operations and personnel. Company L has performed in the finest
tradition of its progenitors - the Merrill's Marauders and the pride
of each man in knowing the precedence that has been set and the spirit
of the 75th Infantry Regiment will insure its perpetuation.
1971 brought increased demands on Company L (Ranger) 75th Infantry as
the company participated in Operations Lam Son 719, 720, and 810.
Flexibility was the key as the Company was employed in 6 man teams,
platoons, and as an entire company as the rapidly changing concepts of
waging the war created new demands. The Company was to pay heavily for
it's successes in the Ashau Valley during Lam Son 720 but inflicted
heavy casualties on the enemy and his equipment.
Although poor weather conditions hampered Ranger operations during
the month of January, the number of enemy sightings increased during
this period. Sightings and contacts were made in the Bach Ma, Spear
Valley, and Roung Roung regions. The use of "false extractions" by the
company during this period proved to be highly successful. Ranger team
Bass, led by SSG Vodden, (Fido), engaged an estimated enemy platoon in
the Spear Valley area resulting in 1 NVA KIA and several more killed
by ARA in close support. Ranger team Octopus, operating in the Spear
Valley, engaged an unknown size enemy force resulting in 1 NVA WIA
(confirmed) and several more NVA WIA (probable). The most significant
accomplishment of the team was it's success in locating and confirming
the identity of elements of the 5th NVA Regiment.
During the month of February the Company deployed a total of 17
Ranger Teams. Poor weather conditions again hampered team deployment.
On 9 February several Ranger Teams were inserted into the Roung Roung
Valley region to replace a infantry battalion that had re-deployed to
the Khe Sahn region. These teams placed special emphasis upon ambush
techniques. During the remainder of the month other Ranger Teams were
active in the abandoned Firebase Ripcord area. Here the emphasis was
placed upon reconnaissance and surveillance of roads and trails
through out the area. In the Ripcord area, Team Phoenix, led by SSG
(Fido) Vodden, engaged an enemy rifle squad carrying a Soviet 7.62 MG.
The team killed 1 NVA, SGT (Butch Cassidy) Sellner, captured the enemy
machine gun, and the team was extracted. Ranger Team Nashville engaged
an unknown size enemy force in the same area resulting in 1 NVA KIA.
In a nearby area, Ranger Team Toronto killed 1 NVA in a engagement
with an unknown size enemy force.
Company L (Ranger) deployed a total of 21 Ranger Teams during the
month of March. Initially concentrating upon reconnaissance of the
area surrounding FSB Ripcord, this unit now shifted to the mission of
monitoring and ambushing along Rt 547 from FB Rendezvous to FB Blaze
and along Rt 548 on the A Shau Valley floor. Six Ranger initiated
contacts with enemy forces in these areas resulted in 8 NVA KIA and 2
NVA POW. Ranger Team Indianapolis led by SGT "Hannibal" Barr, observed
heavy enemy truck movement along Rt 548. During their reconnaissance
they engaged 5 NVA with organic weapons fire. The results were NVA KIA
(confirmed) and 1 NVA KIA (probable) observed carrying an RPD machine
gun at the time of contact. Ranger Team Hamilton, also operating in
the A Shau Valley, engaged 2 NVA resulting in 1 NVA KIA (probable) and
1 US WIA. Ranger Team Medicine Hat IV, led by SGT (Apple Jack) Smith,
had the most significant action during the month. The team engaged and
trapped 3 NVA in a reinforced culvert on Rt 547 in the FB Veghel area.
Results of the contact were one NVA KIA and 2 NVA POW. The team did
suffer 1 US WIA in the engagement. The information that the 101st Abn
Div received from the POW's enabled the 1st Bde to counter a serious
enemy threat to their fire support base in that area.
During the month of April, this unit deployed a total of 29 Ranger
Teams. Teams were deployed in the Spear Valley area from 1 April to 10
April with emphasis on reconnaissance. From 10 April to the end of the
month the unit's mission was company size raids to include platoon
size stay behind ambushes in the A Shau Valley. L Co along with Delta
Troop 2/17 Cavalry, made a raid along Rt 548, a wire cut on an NVA
communications line, and left a platoon size element, led by LT. (Gray
Hog) Sawtelle, for an ambush. The platoon size ambush engaged a 6 man
enemy force that was a communications repair team. By employing
gunships and small arms fire the Rangers killed the enemy and engaged
another platoon size enemy force. The Ranger Platoon was extracted
with gunships for cover. The Rangers suffered 2 killed and 4 wounded.
L Co (Ranger) still containing its well known initiative, staged
another company size raid in the A Shau Valley along Rt 548. The unit,
led by CPT "Rolly Olley" Ohle, was successful in conducting a wire
tap, the destruction of an enemy bridge, and leaving a stay-behind
ambush. Ranger Team Cubs, led by SGT "Georgia Peach" Duran, which was
on radio relay for the platoon conducting the ambush on Rt 548, made
contact with a large enemy force in reinforced bunkers. This
engagement with the NVA resulted in a three day and two night contact
with fierce fighting continuously. The team suffered 3 killed and 1
wounded before reinforcements arrived. The Bravo Troop Air Rifle
Platoon, 2/17 Cav was the immediate reaction force. They were unable
to reach the LZ because of the intense ground fire. Delta Troop 2/17
Cav was inserted next to relieve the pinned down Ranger Team. They
engaged the enemy but were pinned down and suffered heavy losses.
After two days of continuous air strikes, gunships, and artillery on
the enemy positions, along with another US company committed to the
battle, the enemy still refused to give ground. Finally a small
volunteer Ranger Team led by CPT Ohle and SGT "Muldoon" Rothwell,
combat assaulted into the area and drove the enemy force from their
positions, rescued all wounded personnel, and recovered the US dead.
The Rangers provided important information for the 101st Abn Div by
locating elements of the 5th NVA Regiment and inflicting heavy
casualties.
During the month of May, Company L (Ranger) deployed only a total of
12 Ranger Teams. 11 of these teams were deployed in the Roung Roung
Valley region with the mission of reconnaissance. One Ranger Team was
deployed as advisors to the HAC BAO. During an operation on the
eastern ridge of the A Shau Valley, this team was instrumental to an
ARVN victory over the enemy forces they engaged. Ranger Team Tigers
had the only significant contact in May when they engaged a small
enemy force. The team had 1 US wounded and the enemy results were
unknown.
Late May and early June found the company conducting fewer missions
but intensive training of new personnel. They also provided training
for the 1st ARVN Division Reconnaissance Company.
During the month of June, this unit deployed a total of 23 Ranger
Teams. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades all requested the employment of
Rangers around FSB Maureen, Shock, Barnett, and Satan. The missions
were reconnaissance for the 2nd and 3rd Bde. Several enemy sightings
and small contacts were made in these areas of operations giving the
brigades useful information. On 13 June Ranger Team Ohio, led by 1LT
"Currahee" Grange, made a raid northeast of FSB Shock for the 1st Bde.
The mission was reconnaissance in force looking for base camps, way
stations, and cache sites. The team engaged an enemy outpost and a
fire fight lasted several hours. The team employed air strikes and ARA
on enemy positions and routes of escape, while they continued to use
their organic small arms fire power. The Rangers suffered heavy losses
of 5 US WIA and 2 US KIA during the contact. Enemy losses were also
high with many killed and blood trails leading off in several
directions. The 1st Brigade received needed enemy intelligence from
this operation and reacted with larger units. On 29 June the entire
company made a raid to locate an enemy aid station. The company was
led by 1LT "Mountain Man" Montano. Teams were led by SFC (PSG)
"Kamikaze" Kiama, and "Blackie" Batts, on a reconnaissance in force
through the area. 1SG "Bull Moose" Gentry came into the area later
with an emergency re-supply. The Rangers received automatic fire as
they combat assaulted into the area. The unit employed artillery and
ARA on all enemy positions and drove them from the area as they pushed
on to their objective. The Rangers found the old enemy aid station,
but were able to find only 3 NVA KIA. From this raid the 3rd Bde
received important intelligence for future operations in the area.
There were no Ranger losses form this operation making it a total
success in company size operations.
In July, the emphasis on company size operations was decreased and
the six man team again became the standard element of employment. The
company began extensive operations in the Ba Long Valley area and
operated a forward base at Dong Ha and later Quang Tri. The teams were
deployed northwest of FSB Voghel with a mission of reconnaissance for
the 1st Bde. Ranger Team Jane, led by SGT "Killoggs" King, engaged 2
NVA with the results of 2 NVA KIA (probable). The team employed ARA
and artillery and were extracted only to be inserted onto a new LZ.
The 3/5 Cav deployed six Ranger Teams east of FSB Hooker. Several
enemy sightings, rocket and mortar firing sites, and suspected enemy
camps were spotted. Rangers employed artillery on these sites. Six
reconnaissance teams were employed for the 2nd Bde South and North of
FSB Satan. One enemy sighting was made and artillery employed. Company
L (Ranger) also employed one team with the HAC BAO in the southern
portion of the A Shau Valley to act as advisors and interpreters.
Action there resulted in several NVA KIA and light ARVN
casualties.
Company L (Ranger) deployed 23 teams during the month of August. 16
teams reconned for the 3/5 Cav along the Song Thach Han River
southwest of Quang Tri. These Ranger teams revealed some infiltration
into the area by small NVA units. Ranger Team Rodgers made contact
with a small enemy unit with unknown results. Two teams were deployed
near FSB Veghel in support of the first Bde. Two other Ranger teams
reconned around FSB Normandy and found recent enemy activity and
rocket sites. The Rangers also worked for the 2d Bde, north of FSB
Rifle. In this area three Ranger teams made contact with an estimated
NVA reconnaissance platoon all on the same day. Ranger Team Cora, led
by Sgt Ackley (Dagwood), made a point contact with the enemy while
crossing a small stream. The team suffered one US KIA and broke
contact with two enemy KIA (probable). Team Ann, led by Sgt Owens
(Cobra), spotted the enemy preparing an ambush and fired up their
flank. The team broke contact and linked up with Ranger Team Cora. Sgt
King, (Killoggs), leading Team Stella, made a point contact with an
enemy patrol and broke contact, linking up with Teams Cora and Anne.
1LT Grange (Currahee), organized the three teams as the enemy probed
their positions. The Rangers repulsed the enemy with organic weapon
fire and hand grenades. Later that day, CPT Robinson (Iron Ass), came
into the area and extracted two injured Rangers in his command and
control ship. C Company 1/501st Inf reinforced the Rangers during the
contact. Artillery, ARA, and gunships were employed the remainder of
the day. As night approached the Rangers led combined elements to a
safe PZ. This reconnaissance resulted in locating the old (Chi Thua
II) Sapper Battalion. The contacts were exploited by 2nd Bde. The 3rd
Bde inserted Ranger Team Ridgeway, led by 1LT Montano (Mountain Man),
along the Rao Trang River southeast of FSB Ripcord. The insertion ship
received severe ground fire after inserting the team. The team later
found evidence of at least 100 NVA moving through the area, but had no
further contact. Another team of advisors was inserted with the Hac
Pao northwest of FSB Pistol. The Rangers employed ARA and artillery as
they moved into the enemy held areas.
At a ceremony at Camp Eagle, the Company was presented the Valorous
Unit Citation for extraordinary heroism during the period 7 Dec 1969
to 16 Feb 1970.
During the month of September, 23 Ranger Teams were inserted for
reconnaissance missions. 14 teams were employed on both sides of the
Song Thach Han River, southwest of Quang Tri. Two enemy contacts were
made and the Rangers providing a screen on the southern flank of
operation Lam San 820 found evidence of foot and vehicular traffic
between FSB Holcomb and FSB Hooker. Ranger Team Mosbey, led by Sgt
Murphy (Duce), made contact with two to three NVA while on a point
reconnaissance. Sgt. Broyles (Undertaker), killed one NVA (probable).
That night the team had enemy movement and blew their claymores. The
next day the team found two blood trails. Six reconnaissance teams
were employed along the Rao Nong and Song Bo Rivers in support of 3rd
Bde. The teams discovered recent signs of infiltration throughout the
area. Ranger Team Bradley, led by Sgt Wyatt (Body Bag), made contact
with an unknown size enemy force immediately after insertion. The
Rangers broke contact and had an emergency extraction. The contact was
exploited by the 3d Bde. Rangers teams were then deployed for the 2d
Bde south of FSB Rifle. Ranger Team Gavin, led by Sgt Wyatt (Body
Bag), made contact with an estimated enemy platoon in reinforced
bunkers. The team broke contact and called in gunships on the enemy
positions. The team was extracted and reinserted the following day.
Again, immediately after insertion, the team made contact with an
enemy squad. The team killed one NVA (probable), broke contact, and
were extracted. The 2d Bde exploited the contact with gunships,
artillery and a CS drop.
During the month of October, this unit deployed 22 Ranger Teams. From
2 Oct to 13 Oct, 12 Teams were employed in the Ra Long Valley,
southwest of Quang Tri. One heavy contact was made by Ranger Team
Forrest, led by Sgt Lambert (Gloves), when the rangers discovered an
enemy base camp. The Rangers broke contact with one US WIA and the
team had an emergency extraction by ladder. The results were two NVA
killed (probable) and from the exploitation of the 3/5 Cav, a large
cache site was found. Ranger teams throughout the area found bunkers,
rocket launching sites, and enemy infiltration routes. On Oct 15 the
Company was detached from the 2/17 Cavalry and attached to 3d Bde of
the 101st Abn Div and moved from Camp Eagle to Camp Evans. 10 Teams
were employed in support of 3d Bde from 15 to 30 Oct. The Ranger Teams
worked around FSB Gladiator, Helen, and Firestone. The largest
operation of the month was when 2d platoon walked into the mountains
on a nine day operation. Enemy trails, signs, night locations and
sightings were made by Rangers on this operation.
The month of November was the last operational month for L Co Rangers
in Vietnam. During this month 18 Ranger Teams were deployed in support
of the 2d and 3d Bde. Seven teams conducted area reconnaissance in
support of the 2/506 Inf around the FSP Gladiator and Coc A Bo area.
The Rangers called in artillery on several enemy sightings and
suspected base camp areas. There was one NVA sighting where small arms
fire was employed with unknown results. For the 1/506 Inf, six Ranger
teams were employed in the flat and piedmont region south and west of
FSB Jack. Two Ranger Teams were employed along the Song Bo River east
of FSB Baker for surveillance and monitoring of enemy movement along
the river. Several enemy indicators were noted in these areas. These
Ranger missions were of great value to the Third Brigade, since they
provided screening patrolling in the areas of operation of the
battalions that were "standing down" at Camp Evans. During this same
period 3 Ranger teams patrolled the piedmont area south of FBS Arsenal
in support of 2d Bde. Several enemy campfires were spotted and these
were engaged by artillery with unknown results.
On 24 November, 1971, Co L (Ranger) 75th Infantry received orders to
"stand down". By 5 December, 1971, the unit was inactivated, bringing
to a close the history of Co L (Ranger) 75th Infantry in Vietnam.
The men of this unit accomplished what others only dream of and
walked where others have not dared. Our minds and hearts are with
those valiant Rangers who died in these battles.
"Whom shall I send and who will go for us? Here am I, send me."
Key Personnel Serving with Company L (RANGER)
CPT Kenneth R. Eklund 1 Feb 69- 13 Feb 69
CPT Lannie D. Cardona 13 Feb 69- 19 Jul 69
CPT Robert A. Guy 19 Jul 69- 20 May 70
CPT James D. Stowers 20 May 70- 15 Aug 70
CPT David H. Ohle 21 Aug 70- 1 Jul 71
CPT William L. Robinson 1 Jul 71- 5 Dec 71
1SG James G. Farrington 1 Feb 69- 12 Mar 69
1SG Clarence J. Carden 12 Mar 69- 18 Mar 69
1SG Robert F. Gilbert 18 Mar 69- 20 June 70
1SG William J. Unzicker 16 May 70- 1 Mar 71
1SG Neal R. Gentry 17 Mar 71- 21 Nov 71
SFC Raymond T. Duffy 21 Nov 71- 5 Dec 71
1LT David H. Ohle
1LT Robert Johnson
1LT Stephen Osborne
1LT Kevin Henry
1LT Michael Grim
1LT William Brownsberger
1LT Claude Alexander
1LT James Smith KIA
1LT Paul Sawtelle KIA
1LT James Montano
1LT David Grange
1LT William Prince
1LT Robert Snyder
1LT Robert Suchke Feb. to July 1971
PSG Donald Brickle
PSG Milton Lockett
PSG Konrad Taylor
PSG Troy Rocha
PSG Harold Kaiama
PSG Howard Dobbs
PSG Aubrey Batts
PSG Clarence Downs
SFC James Johnson
SFC Jose Mendosa
SFC Gilbert Parker
SFC Andrew Smith
SFC Fred Zabitoski [CMOH]
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